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MODERN FAMILY: INTRAFAMILY ADOPTION IN
LOUISIANA AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
(COSTANZA AND BREWER V. CALDWELL)
Tiffany S. Bush *
I. INTRODUCTION
When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does
not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written
and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of
the legislature. 1 This code article illustrates one of the most
fundamental notions of the civil law tradition. Louisiana’s Civil
Code and the state’s constitution often have run-ins with each
other, but issues have often been resolved by reference to the civil
code’s idea that clear meaning should be adopted where reasonable
and unless clear meaning leads to strange results, it should always
be followed.
But, when the clear meaning of the Civil Code and Louisiana’s
constitution conflict with the less clear meaning of the 14th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a conflict arises that is not so
easily resolved. Over time, the federal courts have interpreted 14th
Amendment to provide various protections of citizens’ rights. 2 The
* J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May 2016) Paul M. Hébert Law Center,
Louisiana State University. The author would like to thank Professor Olivier
Moréteau for his continued guidance and support in preparing this note.
Additionally, the author would like to acknowledge the vigorous efforts of the
Journal of Civil Law Studies’ staff.
This note was written prior to the judgment delivered on June 26, 2015, by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), ruling
that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
1. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 9.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant part, states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

264

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

Supreme Court of the United States, several times, has extended
these protections to individuals who were previously
unrepresented, but due to a widespread change in societal attitudes,
there was a shift in societal norms that warranted change.
Louisiana and states like it have been resistant to these periodic
shifts of societal norms.
This case presents a particularly confounding disagreement
between the Code, Louisiana’s Constitution and the U.S.
Constitution on the issue of same-sex marriage. Though the Civil
Code is clear on the status of same-sex marriage in Louisiana, the
changing face of the family structure in our society may mean that
the relevant code articles are outdated. Historically, Louisiana has
been reluctant to change their laws in the face of an evolving
society and many times, Louisiana has been one of the last states to
change its laws and customs, especially in cases where the debate
is on a substantial issue such as marriage and society seems to take
an approach in opposition of that accepted in Louisiana.
Interestingly, Louisiana judges make their voices heard in the
debate and the opinions issued may come as a surprise. This case
note will briefly discuss the issues at play in the case and analyze
the way in which the court tackled issues and produced an opinion
that strategically dismantles the archaic norms that are currently
adhered to in Louisiana.
II. BACKGROUND
In 2004, Chasity Brewer gave birth to a baby boy while living
in California. 3 At the time, Brewer was unmarried, and the child
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza and Brewer v. Caldwell, No. 2013-0052
D2, [15th JDC] (Feb. 22, 2014). At the time of this comment, there were no
page numbers available for the judge’s ruling because the opinion had not yet
been published. Therefore, all citations to this ruling are to the whole opinion in
general.
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was conceived as a result of insemination by an anonymous sperm
donor. 4 In 2008, Brewer and her partner, Angela Costanza, were
married in California, where same-sex marriages are permitted. 5
By 2013, the couple came to live in Lafayette Parish in the state of
Louisiana and in July 2013, Angela Costanza filed a petition for
intrafamily adoption so that she may have parental rights to
Brewer’s son. 6
In January of 2014, counsel for Costanza and Brewer presented
the couples’ entire adoption file to the court. 7 Costanza, Brewer
and their child were present, but the Attorney General for
Louisiana was not. 8 The court reviewed the entire adoption file
and, after finding that all contents were in the proper form, granted
the intrafamily adoption on January 27, 2014. 9
In March 2014, the Attorney General for Louisiana, James
Caldwell, filed an appeal in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 10
Citing Louisiana’s Code of Civil Procedure, the Attorney General
stated that he was not given notice or any opportunity to be heard
and the judgment should be vacated and remanded because of
this. 11 Costanza and Brewer (the “petitioners”) asked the court to
4. “According to the California Uniform Parentage Act, the anonymous
sperm donor bears no rights to and no responsibilities for children born through
donor insemination using his semen. The biological father remains to be
unknown.” Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza and Brewer v. Caldwell, No. 20130052 D2, [15th JDC] (Feb. 22, 2014).
5. At the time of their marriage, both women were at the age of majority.
6. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3.
7. The Fifteenth Judicial District Court of Louisiana, In re Adoption of
N.B., 140 So.3d 1263 (2014).
8. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3.
9. The court reviewed a number of documents, including: an Authentic Act
of Consent to Adoption from the biological mother (Chasity Brewer), a criminal
records check from the Sheriff of Lafayette Parish, and a Child Welfare State
Central Registry Check. The final decree of adoption and judgment was signed
on February 5, 2014.
10. Attorney General Caldwell moved the court for a Suspensive Appeal
from the final adoption decree signed in February. Additionally, the Attorney
General and the Governor (the “defendants”) also filed a peremptory exception
of no cause of action and both sides filed motions for summary judgment. See
Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza and Brewer v. Caldwell, No. 2013-0052 D2,
[15th JDC] (Feb. 22, 2014).
11. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1572:
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reaffirm the February 2014 judgment of adoption and alleged that
their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection guaranteed by the
14th amendment of the United States Constitution would be denied
if the final decree of adoption was thrown out. 12 Additionally,
petitioners asserted that the state of Louisiana violated Article IV,
Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Full Faith &
Credit Clause, by refusing to recognize their California marriage. 13
Lastly, petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Louisiana’s
Defense of Marriage Act 14 and several articles of the Louisiana
Civil Code.15

The clerk shall give written notice of the date of the trial whenever a
written request therefore is filed in the record or is made by registered
mail by a party or counsel of record. This notice shall be mailed by the
clerk, by certified mail, properly stamped and addressed, at least ten
days before the date fixed for the trial. The provisions of this article
may be waived by all counsel of record at a pre-trial conference.
12. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3.
13. “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
14. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15:
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union of one
man and one woman. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall
construe this constitution or any state law to require that marriage or
the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any member of a union
other than the union of one man and one woman. A legal status
identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried
individuals shall not be valid or recognized. No official or court of the
state of Louisiana shall recognize any marriage contracted in any other
jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and one woman.
15. The challenged civil code provisions are as follows:
“Marriage is a legal relationship between a man and a woman that is created
by civil contract. The relationship and the contract are subject to special rules
prescribed by law.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 86.
“Persons of the same sex may not contract marriage with each other.” LA.
CIV. CODE art. 89.
LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15:
A purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a strong
public policy of the state of Louisiana and such a marriage contracted
in another state shall not be recognized in this state for any purpose,
including the assertion of any right or claim as a result of the purported
marriage.
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III. DECISION OF THE COURT
The court addressed four issues set forth by the parties:
– Whether Louisiana Constitution Article XII, Section 15 (the
Defense of Marriage Act), and Louisiana Civil code Articles 86,
89, and 3520(B) violate the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution;
– Whether, for purposes of the federal Due Process Clause, the
right to marry someone of the same sex is a right deeply grounded
in our Nation’s history and tradition;
– Whether the authority to recognize out-of-state marriages
falls within the traditional authority of States over domestic
relations law; and
– Whether Louisiana Constitution Art. XII, Section 15,
Louisiana Civil Code Articles 86, 89, and 3520(B) violate Article
IV, Section I, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, of the United States
Constitution.16
The court ruled that Louisiana’s Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the 14th amendment and is therefore unconstitutional. 17
Additionally, Louisiana Civil Code Articles 86, 89, and 3520(B)
were also declared unconstitutional for violating the same
provisions of the U.S. Constitution.18
With regard to the question of whether the right to marry
someone of the same sex constitutes a fundamental right for
purposes of the Due Process Clause, the court appears to conclude
that the right is fundamental. The court’s analysis of this issue was
largely made up of an analogy drawn between this case and
Kitchen v. Herbert, a case that came out of the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, where a same-sex couple sought to have their marriage
recognized in Utah. 19
16.
17.
18.
19.

Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3.
Id.
Id.
See, generally, Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).

268

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

The court also relied on similar reasoning that was adopted by
a number of other cases to bolster their position. 20 Last, the court
held that the authority to recognize out-of-state marriages does not
fall within the traditional authority of States over domestic
relations law and, as such, the relevant provisions of the Louisiana
Constitution and Civil Code violate the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution and is unconstitutional. 21
IV. COMMENTARY
Same-sex marriage has been a hot-button issue for scholars,
legislators and the judiciary. Though the primary focus for the
courts has been the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans, 22
with many states moving to legalize same-sex marriage, focus has
slowly been shifting towards the legal effects of same-sex marriage
in states that continue to ban gay marriage. This court methodically
analyzed each constitutional issue and by drawing on several
strong policy concerns of Louisiana, issued a ruling that should
stand if reviewed by an appellate court. 23
According to the judgment, the Louisiana provisions that
outlaw same-sex marriage (art. 86 La. CC and La. Const.) and
forbid the recognition of same-sex marriages contracted out of
state (La. Const.) violate two clauses in the U.S. Constitution.24
The court found Louisiana DOMA’s tendency to “make
unequal a subset of state-sanctioned marriages” violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal
Protection Clause requires that no state shall deny a person equal
protection under its laws. Louisiana’s DOMA, as well as the Civil
Code articles, specifically article 86, does just that. Equal
20. See Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3.
21. Id.
22. The United States Supreme Court is expected to address the issue in
Summer 2015.
23. The Attorney General appealed the judgment to the Louisiana Supreme
Court and the appeal is currently pending.
24. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3.
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protection has not been interpreted to tolerate equal application of
facially discriminatory laws. Instead, the Equal Protection Clause
requires that states protect the constitutional rights of all
individuals. The right to marry has been identified as a
fundamental right protected by the United States Constitution.25
Additionally, some courts have recognized other rights bearing
close relation to the right to marry, such as a parent’s right to raise
their children, without undue interruption from the state, as being
protected by the Constitution as well. 26
Both provisions of Louisiana law expressly limit legal
recognition of marriage between a man and woman only. These
provisions unduly interfere with the rights of same-sex couples to
marry by not allowing their marriage to be recognized legally. In
turn, same-sex couples are unable to benefit from the civil effects
of marriage, including intrafamily adoption like Constanza and
Brewer are trying to attain here. Furthermore, the additional Civil
Code articles at issue here blatantly violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution because they facially discriminate
against a certain class of individuals by not allowing them to
marry, simply because of who they choose to marry.
Next, the court tackled the issue of Louisiana’s refusal to
recognize a same-sex marriage lawfully entered into in
California. 27 The petitioners asserted that the state’s refusal to
recognize their marriage violated Article IV, Section I, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, of the United States Constitution, stating
that the denial is “unmerited and does not fall within the discretion
of a State” 28 and further, Louisiana has not cited any compelling
public policy that would allow the state to deny valid marriages
25. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1967).
26. Here, the court quoted the Tenth Circuit case, Kitchen v. Hebert, saying:
“Thus childrearing, a liberty closely related to the right to marry, is one
exercised by same-sex and opposite-sex couples alike, as well as by single
individuals.” Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3 (quoting Kitchen, supra
n. 19).
27. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3.
28. Id.
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from other states. 29 The defendants contended that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not require the state of Louisiana to
recognize the out-of-state marriage because “[o]ne State’s
marriage is not a ‘judgment’ that merits full faith and credit in
another State.” 30 Citing two older Supreme Court cases directly on
point, 31 the court agreed with the petitioners’ arguments on this
point, finding that marriage has, historically, been recognized as a
judgment that merits full faith and credit in another state. 32
The constitutional analysis set forth by the court is very strong
on its own, but the court increases the strength of the argument by
using the state’s strong policy of promoting intact families and
making decisions in the best interest of the children. 33 The
defendants argued that Louisiana’s marriage and adoption laws are
linked to the furtherance of two state interests: “a) linking children
to intact families formed by their biological parents, and b)
ensuring that fundamental social change occurs through
widespread social consensus.” 34Citing the ruling from Meyer v.
Nebraska, the court stated that the right to marry and raise children
is a fundamental right and that the petitioners “are in a better
position than the state to make decisions regarding the custody and
care of the child.” 35 The court added that “there is no rational
connection between Louisiana’s laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage and its goal of linking children to intact families formed
by their biological parents, or ensuring that fundamental social
29. Id.
30. Citing the RESTATEMENT (2D) CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 92, Williams v.
North Carolina, Sevcik, Baker v. Nelson.
31. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 269 U.S. 268 (1935); Sherrer v.
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
32. In Milwaukee County, the Court held that “the public policy of the
forum state must give way,” because the “very purpose of the full-faith and
credit clause was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties.” In Sherrer, the Court ordered Massachusetts to give full faith and
credit to a Florida divorce decree.
33. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3.
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska).
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change occurs through widespread social consensus.” 36 Since
Louisiana already allows adoptions by foster parents and those
with no biological link to the child, according to the court here, it
would be illogical to say that intact families are only those that are
formed by a child’s biological parents.” 37
The court addressed Louisiana’s Defense of Marriage Act and
adopted the reasoning set forth in United States v. Windsor, where
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act
because “it found that the purpose of that Act [was] to influence or
interfere with the state’s sovereign choices about who may be
married.” 38 Quoting Windsor, the court added: “DOMA’s principal
effect is to identify and make unequal a subset of state-sanctioned
marriages. It contrives to deprive some couples married under the
laws of their state, but not others, of both rights and
responsibilities. [T]hough Congress has great authority to design
laws to fit its own conception of sound national policy, it cannot
deny the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.” 39 Though U.S. v. Windsor struck down the federal
DOMA for violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the state laws and legislation must comport with the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 40 Finding that
Louisiana’s DOMA was drafted with almost the exact language of
the federal DOMA, the court ruled that the constitutional provision
is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no question that the face of what constitutes a
“family” is changing. Our society’s view of same-sex marriage has
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing United States v. Windsor).
39. Id.
40. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
incorporated the Bill of Rights against the states.
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slowly shifted from disapproval and prejudice towards same-sex
couples to an attitude of tolerance and many are proponents of
equal protection of gay couples under our laws. With increasing
pressure from the public to change the laws that discriminate
against same-sex couples and increasing splits in the state court
system, the final word on same-sex marriage may soon be
pronounced by the Supreme Court of the United States. Though
there is a large portion of the population who advocate for
marriage rights for same-sex couples, there are still those who
favor the traditional recognition of marriage between a man and
woman only.
This case illustrates a coming change in the United States and a
remarkable turn in state court adjudication. Southern states, in
general, strongly favor the traditional approach. This makes the
courage displayed by the Honorable Judge Rubin ruling all the
more commendable. In order to effect widespread change, the state
courts need to keep producing opinions striking down the state
laws that unconstitutionally deprive same-sex couples of their
rights. There will be more rulings like Judge Rubin’s, moving up
through the court system and signaling the need for the Supreme
Court to hear and ultimately decide the legality of same-sex
marriage in the United States. Until that time, state court judges
will play a prominent role in applying pressure to state legislatures
to repeal their discriminatory laws. 41

41. Since the presiding district judge, the Honorable Judge Rubin, declared
provisions of Louisiana’s state law unconstitutional, the Attorney General was
entitled to a direct appeal to the state’s Supreme Court. The appeal is currently
pending and was argued before the Louisiana Supreme Court January 25, 2015.

